History," delivered before the Royal Geographical Society. 2 Fifteen years later, in 1919, as the victor nations were embarking upon the stormy seas of negotiation over the postwar settlements, he elaborated his original ideas in Democratic Ideals and Reality. 3 As is well known, neither statement was accorded much attention at the time, but the strategic patterns of World War II coupled with the belated discovery of the deep German interest in it gave the Mackinder thesis considerable notoriety. Indeed, it has received sufficient fame as to make unnecessary any full restatement. Suffice to note that Mackinder's thesis, like that of his contemporary American geopolitician Admirai Mahan, was a theory of positional su, premacy. But whereas Mahan looked upon the one, interconnected "World Ocean" as the key area requisite for world domination, Mackinder saw the "Heartland," a carefully defined portion of the Eurasian interior, as the vital position which, with the technical instruments of the twen, tieth century, could be developed and integrated into a resource and man, power base for the potential superpower of the globe. 4 This thesis did not, of course, go unchallenged; Mackinder himself made several changes in a wartime reassessment. 5 In many ways, the most important critique came from an American, Professor Nicholas J. Spykman of Y ale. Spykman had already established himself as one of the few Amer, ican geopolitical experts with his America's Strategy in World Politics, 6 and in 1944 some of his notes were assembled and published posthumously as The Geography of the Peace. 7 lt was a clear and concise scrutiny, which concluded with a new interpretation. Spykman accepted Mackinder's per, spective as a valuable analytical framework but concluded that both recent history and the prospective strategic patterns of the postwar world would indicate that Mackinder's "Inner or Marginal Crescent," the continental periphery of Eurasia, rather than the heartland was the critical zone. Spyk, man renamed this periphery the "Rimland,'' thereby contributing a euphonious corollary to the famous Mackinder term.
It is not the purpose here to elaborate upon these two geopolitical interpretations. They are important views and the student of international affairs ought to be familiar with them. Indeed, the American postwar foreign policy of "containment" and the existent pattern of alliances is in general an implementation, whether conscious or not I cannot say, of Spykman's theory of the critical nature of the rimland. The concern here is with terminology and with the basic geographical framework upon which these theories rest. Mackinder and Spykman have given us fresh ideas as to how to view the world in meaningful perspective; their concepts of heartland and rimland are useful and important. Y et it is becoming increasingly apparent that there are certain problems associated with them. In the first place, despite the fact that both men drew liberally upon historical situations in their analyses, each primarily focused upon the particular geopolitical context of his time. The inevitable result has been a certain rigidity in the concepts and their full meaning becomes increasingly historical and less applicable in detail to the dynamic patterns of current times. If people continue to employ these terms and mold their thinking upon these concepts there is the ironie danger that they will lead to but another stereotyped view of the world which does not reflect reality. On the other hand, "heartland" and "rimland" are exceedingly handy and attractive terms and they have worked their way into the common vocabulary of both academic and journalistic circles. Inevitably popularization has loosened them from their original context and they are often glibly employed without careful reference to the theories of their originators.
There remains yet another danger: that they will become mere tools of the propagandist who seeks to delude the public. We have only to recall the history of German geopolitics to remind ourselves of how such terms can become the "cabalistic catchwords" of a pseudo-science. 8 It is of real importance, therefore, that "heartland" and "rimland" be rescued from any of these possibilities and given firm anchor in definition. If they are to become of maximum value, applicable beyond any momentary context of strategic patterns, those definitions must become specific in concept yet flexible in historical-spatial use. Or, to put it another way, they must relate to types of positions.
Obviously, the first matter is the kind of criteria upon which such terms should be grounded. Although a geographer might be expected to find his criteria in the physical geography of Eurasia, such expectation could hardly spring from an understanding of the theoretical nature of the field. Contrary to an all too common opinion, geographers do not uncritically search ' for ways in which the physical earth governs the destinies of man. Rather they insist that one cannot spin any web of meaning between "earth" and "man" as abstractions, but only between specific earth and specific man at a specific time. One cannot study the physical patterns of Eurasia and assess their human significance unless one deals with particular culture groups. Our definitions of heartland and rimland must therefore be rooted in cultural, or, 1 should like to term them, functional criteria. There has been a noticeable tendency, although neither Mackinder nor Spykman evidenced it, to equate heartland and rimland with land power and sea power. Such thinking shows the need for careful definition. For while the heartland, being wholly interior or at least blocked from the open sea, inevitably suggests land power, rimland by no means implies sea power, and furthermore neither does insular position imply maritime orientation. Island peoples are by no means necessarily seafaring folk. Our criteria, therefore, must rest primarily upon the actual functional orientation of the people or state, not upon simple position in relation to land and sea. lmplied in this suggested focus is the translation of these terms onto a broader plane of significance, beyond a purely military context. By so doing, we may expand their usefulness and yet allow them to carry ample geopolitical connotations. Both Mackinder and Spykman divided Eurasia into three strategic realms: (1) Heartland; (2) lnner Crescent (Mackinder) or Rimland (Spykman); and (3) Outer Crescent (Mackinder) or Marginal Seas (Spykman).9 On the basis of the functional criteria and the broadened relevance suggested, a fivefold division is proposed: (1) Heartland; (2) Continental Rimland; (3) Maritime Rimland; (4) Extrainsular; and (5) lntrainsular. Each of these concepts will be discussed in turn.
Mackinder defined his heartland hydrographically, as including the Eurasian area in which the rivers drain either to the interior or to the seasonally frozen Arctic. He reasoned that such an area would be invulnerable to the direct access of surface sea power, as it certainly is, although it would perhaps have been better to define it directly in terms of sea power capabilities than to search for some physical pattern which approximated the need. Actually, in each of his three statements Mackinder made some revision in the definition of his heartland to adjust it more closely to the strategic picture, illustrating the instability inherent in the concept as long as its relevance rests solely within a purely military-strategic con- 1. With the exception of the Tibetan plateau, it has broadly similar physical conditions which have allowed, though certainly not required, basically similar cultures to become established throughout the region. A high degree of cultural mobility and contact, of migration, interpenetration, and replacement have been outstanding characteristics. The pastoral-oasis economic and settlement complex, similar (though not uniform) in animals, crops, and techniques, is deeply rooted throughout. Only in language (Turkic and Mongolian) and religion (lslamic and Buddhist) are really significant cultural diff erences apparent, and these do not impair the functional unity of the area.
2. This region is indisputably "interior," in the areal "heart" of the continent, and thus has centrality with respect to all the remaining mainland. This nodal position has functional significance, for it allows a true heartland power the potentiality of exerting direct pressure upon the entire continental circumference. ln this sense Mackinder's original term "pivot area" was a meaningful description. As he vividly pointed out, the Mongol era of the thirteenth century provides the outstanding functional illustration of this quality of the core of Eurasia, when the horsemen based upon the fertile valleys of Mongolia thrust outward in nearly every direction, pushing deep into Muscovy nearly to Novgorod; into Silesia, Moravia, and Hungary, southwestward to the Turkish Mediterranean, Syria, and the Persian Gulf; over the ranges into the Punjab and Upper Ganges; and finally overrunning the whole of China to the southern seas. Never before or since has the positional advantage of this nuclear area been utilized so ' 0 Mackinder's original "pivot area" or "Heartland" was entirely hydrographically defined.
To his 1919 heartland he added the uppermost almost inaccessible valleys of the Chinese and Indian rivers in Tibet. In 1943 he withdrew "Lenaland," the eastern plateau and mountain sector of Siberia, from the heartland. In 1919 he also sug. gested that "East Europe," the area of Black Sea and Baltic drainage excepting the upper valley of the Danube, could be made under certain circumstances to fonction as part of the heartland. These alterations of the heartland are but minor indications of his more radical revisions of the thesis as a whole.
sharply and comprehensively, but other peoples have given it partial expression and theoretically the potential has persisted from the time of continent-wide settlement.
3. This heartland, like Mackinder's, includes the nexus of all the historie land routes interconnecting the several rimland areas of China, India, the Levant, and Europe. The patterns of physical f eatures and human settlement cause these routes to converge in Afghanistan and the adjacent valleys of southern Turkestan. Again, this feature has had functional historical meaning, best represented by the reign of the Kushans in the second century A.D. who sat astraddle the Afghan highlands in control of bath Bactria and the Punjab, thereby gathering in tribute from every important strand of overland trade among the marginal realms.
Thus a heartland so defined has historical relevance and moreover, as will be seen, retains ample significance in our own time.
We may now turn to the rimland -the whole of the remaining area upon the continent peripheral to the heartland. Bath Mackinder and Spykman suggested that this entire area is the natural realm either of sea powers or of "amphibious states,'' those looking bath to land and to sea. But in terms of actual state orientations this is an oversimplification. Rather, we more commonly find divergent orientations depending upon the political and economic configurations of any particular group during a particular era.
China will serve as an example. Although lying on the eastern rim of the continent, with a very lengthy coastline, China certainly cannot be passed off as a sea state nor even an amphibious one. In her early history only a very shallow fringe of the southern coast was of maritime orientation. The basic cultural pattern developed in the northern interior near the contact zone with the heartland. Land-based northerners have dominated Chinese culture thoughout most of her history and whenever they have been in political control, as under the Han, T'ang, Mongol, and Manchu dynasties, China has been oriented primarily inwardly as a landed, peasant society with her strategic frontier resting upon the steppe zone of the heartland margin. On the other hand, when control was exercised by South China groups, as under the Southern Sungs, the Mings, and the recent Nationalist government, a strong maritime outlook was emphasized. The coastlands from the Y angtze southward carried on a flourishing trade encompassing the Malaysian Archipelago and reaching deep into the lndian Ocean. Large navies were in being, the great coastal ports grew, and the national government was centered in the south rather than upon the interior margins of the North China plain.11 Thus no single categorization will do. In the former instances, China functioned as a continental rimland state, in the latter as a maritime rimland state.
Turning to India, the jutting of this gigantic peninsula deep into the northern Indian Ocean may tempt one to infer that it is "logically" a maritime rimland state. But there is nothing natural or inherent in this at all. Actually, the Indian peninsula was never united into a single state until the mature phase of British occupation in the early twentieth century. The historie split has always been between north and south, between the Indo-Gangetic plain and the southern peninsula. Until the British conquest the northern area was always an inwardly oriented, agricultural state. The Aryans, who provided one of the basic ingredients in the historie Indian culture pattern, were a wholly nonmaritime people who migrated into the Gangetic arena from the heartland. Each of the succeeding empires, such as the Mauryan, Gupta, and Muslim, set their capitals upon the great interior plain somewhere between Delhi and Patna and ruled over a landed society. Such states were continental rimland powers. On the other hand, in the old Dravidian south a maritime tradition and orientation flourished for millennia, most completely represented, perhaps, by the Chola of the eleventh century and Vijayanagar of the fourteenth. This southern peninsula was clearly functioning as part of the maritime rimland. The European penetration was, of course, a sea power penetration, led by the Portuguese and followed by the French and British. For two centuries it had a shallow impact upon the peninsula coastline from Surat to the Ganges Delta. Only gradually did the British move inland, but ultimately the railroad allowed deep penetration and the reorientation of the entire Indian economy to oversea trade. Thus the three great port cities, Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta, are all of British origin, and for many years the British capital was in the latter port rather than inland at some historie Indian center. 12 British India therefore represented the transformation of the entire Indian subcontinent into a maritime rimland state.
11 The maritime facilities and trade of Nationalist China were of course primarily in nonChinese hands. The capital of the Southern Sungs was at Nanking and later at Hangchow. Of the Mings, Kirby notes: "From the economic point of view the early Ming was soundly based on the Yangtse area, with Nanking as capital. lt seems to have been merely through a dynastie dispute, originally, that the Yung Lo Emperor (1403-24) transferred the capital to Peking. But the move was a victory for the military party; for strategic reasons the capital remained at Peking, at heavy cost to the economic interests of the regime and the country." Stuart Kirby, Introduction ta the Economie History of China (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1954), p. 174. Nanking remained a center of unusual importance throughout the Ming period, and was the seat of the Nationalist government until the Japanese conquest. 12 Madras and Calcutta were founded by the East India Company. Bombay was a minor settlement in the pre-European period, and did not become an important port until after it came under the Company's contrai in 1668.
Glancing quickly at Southwest Asia, we again may note divergent ori, entations, areally and historically. Despite the often used description of "the land of the fi.ve seas," the maritime orientation has been confi.ned to shallow margins such as Phoenicia, Aden, and Muscat. Egyptian, Baby, lonian, Hittite, Assyrian, Persian, and T urkish military power was pri, marily land power and the societies themselves have been pastoral and agricultural with a considerable overland trade but only a minor active participation in sea trade. 13 This continental orientation lasted until the breaching of a seaway through Suez brought about conquest by European sea powers.
As for mainland Europe, there is not space to trace in any detail, but in general the maritime rimland was likewise a very narrow fringe until the nineteenth century. Venice, Genoa, Catalonia, Seville, Portugal, Hol, land, and the German Hanse towns represented localities primarily or at least importantly oriented into maritime patterns. But despite the dense network of transalpine and other overland trade routes, technological limi, tations on transport kept the whole interior largely inwardly and locally focused. Spykman speaks of the "thousand,year struggle between Teuton and Slav" as representative of the struggle between rimland and heart, land, 14 but certainly until the nineteenth century this struggle had no fun, damental importance to the power configurations of Eurasia as a wholeit was rather a local struggle between two peoples of the continental rim, land, little different from the preceding struggle between Teuton and Celt.
The nineteenth century with its canals and railroads again marked the change. Here we do not have an alien conqueror pushing inland from the coasts but the graduai reorientation of nearly the whole of Central Europe to the vast network of maritime trade. Such remote areas as Bohemia and Silesia, Bavaria and Austria were caught up in this oceanic complex, and despite the persistence of peasant agriculture it would be possible to main, tain that the whole of Europe up to the borders of the Ottoman and Rus, sian empires, and including even the Baltic fringe of the latter, was func, tionally a maritime rimland realm by the close of the last century.
W e may now turn to our last categories, which ref er to the important offshore islands. These are deserving of special attention, for nowhere is there a greater need for emphasis upon the functional orientation of the 13 The great Turkish fleet at Lepanto might suggest otherwise; however, the whole context of Ottoman naval efforts contirms this point of view: "Their entire history impelled the Osmanlis to warfare on land, only the force of circumstances, not their own inclination, led them out to sea . nation as the proper criterion of classification. lt is rather commonly implied in the literature that Britain and Japan are "natural" sea powers, that such was foreordained by "geography" and is simply logical and obvious. But there is no such logic in the nature of things. One need only examine British history to see the fallacy of such assumptions. ln preRoman Britain the lowland peoples of the southeast were firmly rooted in an agricultural society. Roman Britain itself, while having certain essential cross-channel connections and even a small export grain traffic, could hardly be classifi.ed as a maritime realm, and Anglo-Saxon England was primarily an agricultural England. Not until the Anglo-Danish period do we fi.nd any really signifi.cant maritime orientation, reaching its culmina-
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PROPOSED HEARTLANO tion in Canute's North Sea thalassocracy which knit together England, Denmark, Norway, and the west coast of Sweden. Then following the Noman Conquest there is a reversion to an inward, agricultural orientation. Only gradually during the Tudor period with the Anglo-French wars and the growth of North Sea-Baltic trade is an outward shift evident, and not until the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, particularly after the Anglo-Dutch wars, does England emerge as a full-fledged maritime state, with a formidable navy, merchant marine, and overseas empire. 15 ln the latter nineteenth century this is elaborated with the growth of a national economy uniquely a·nd vitally dependent upon overseas connections.
Functionally, therefore, again a twofold classification is needed and "intrainsular" and "extrainsular" are suggested as possible terms to describe the inward and outward orientations of an island state.
If we turn our glance to the opposite sicle of Eurasia we find an even more dramatic expression of both orientations in the history of Japan. Sixteenth-century Japan was certainly extrainsular. Japanese pirates and traders infested the China seas and at the end of the century the island nation launched an audacious invasion of the. mainland through Korea. Then in the mid-seventeenth century came a startling reversa} when the T okugawa regime closed its doors upon the world and purposely turned inward into a "cultural hibernation" for 230 years. 16 A century ago began the dramatic reopening and development of the new Japan which became almost the archetype of the extrainsular state.
A third important insular area adjacent to Eurasia is the East lndies, including the functionally insular Malayan peninsula. This realm may be classified as extrainsular throughout the history of at least the last fi.fteen hundred years, with a succession of sea states from Sri Vijaya through the Javanese states culminating in Madjapahit, the Moslem Malacca Sultanates, and the European sea power holdings, shifting in main base but all focused upon control of the key sea passageways of Malacca Hall, 1954) , a volume which may be highly recommended for study of historie patterns of Monsoon Asia. 11 Brief mention may be made of two other areas which are technically peninsular but which have been so functionally severed from the mainland by the Jack of overland communication through almost uninhabited wildernesses as to be "functionally insular": Scandinavia, connected with the continent only through the subarctic wastes of Lapland, and the tiny Arab sea states -Aden, Makalla, Muscat -clinging intermittently along the margin of the Arabian peninsula, insulated by the empty wastes of the interior desert. It was from these maritime enclaves that the Arabs made contact around the Indian Ocean periphery from Sofala to Malacca.
T urning now to the functional relations among these zones in modern history we may note certain broad patterns of significance. The initial European expansions into non-European Eurasia outflanked the heartland. The Portuguese, Dutch, French, and British came by sea around the African promontory to capture offshore islands and coastal ports as strategic positions along the continental rim from the Strait of Bab el Mandeb to Formosa. The great trading companies concentrated upon gathering accessible, exotic products for shipment to European markets; contrai over the interiors extended, as one historian has well said, but a cannon-shot from the stockades. Initially, therefore, the European sea powers merely took over the functions of Arab, Dravidian, Malay, and South Chinese traders, capturing the existent shallow maritime rimland. 18 Not until the nineteenth century did a comprehensive change take place, although some of the modern trends were apparent earlier in British India. The industrial age with its omnivorous demand for volume trade in basic raw materials and for extensive export markets, together with its own distinctive technical instruments, marked the shift. Now the penetration inland proceeded rapidly; through the railroad and the river gunboat the tide of sea power rolled inward until it lapped against the Himalayas and the eastern fastnesses of Tibet. The whole continental rimland was wrenched out of its landward patterns and turned outward toward the sea. Along the muddy banks of the coastline great Europeanized commercial centers arose: Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, Rangoon, Saigon, Shanghai, Tsingtao, Tientsin -focal points of the new alien industrial European age. To avoid the long route around the Cape the Suez Canal was dug, and became so strategically vital as to demand the capture of the adjacent continental Moslem states. The whole of North Africa, the Levant, and margins of the Red Sea and Persian Gulf came under sea power domination and were converted into a maritime rimland.
In Europe itself the changes have already been mentioned, the whole realm west of Russia becoming knit ever more closely into the world commercial network. Germany's response to these new conditions was symptomatic of her internai and positional dichotomy. Out of the Rhineland, the Ruhr, and the world port of Hamburg extended the tentacles of a rapidly expanding international trade, augmented by a powerful navy and colonies in Africa and the Pacifie. On the other hand, much of the interest of the continental Prussian capital was focused upon the Balkans, T urkey, and the East: "Berlin to Bagdad" represented a continental land power attempt to skirt the heartland and outflank the sea lanes to the Orient.
But attention must now be shifted to the north where the heartland was also outflanked by a new route. Pushing eastward through the great forest Russian adventurers and fur traders reached the Pacifie in 1638. However, this advance was of little strategic consequence over the next two centuries, for power could not be applied eff ectively through the me, dium of boat, sled, and cart. But in the last century railroads were pushed eastward into Siberia, and even prior to railroad penetration the final assault upon the heartland was underway. Less than a century ago the independent Moslem states of Bokhara, Merv, Khiva, and Ferghana yielded to Russian conquest. The eastern heartland, Sinkiang and Mongolia, re, mained only temporarily a buffer. 19 With this a whole new strategic configuration emerged. With the heartland the captive of a European continental rimland power and the continental rimland of Asia absorbed and converted into a deep maritime zone, land power and sea power met in the interior along an almost continuous frontier from central Persia to southem Manchuria. But the most significant aspect lay not in the military frontier but behind it on either sicle. The crucial diff erence in the ultimate quality of these positions is only becoming recognized in the shock of post, World War II changes. Indeed, until recently few but would have thought the capture of the rimland of far greater significance than that of the heart, land. The wealth pouring back into the maritime European economies in contrast to the slowly developing backward zones of the Russian Empire was seemingly adequate testimony. Both captive zones were initially held by armies, supported by the overland space,conqueririg instrument, the railway. But the Russians had another weapon in their arsenal, the "space, filling" colonist -a tool the Western sea powers did not have. Only the outermost middle latitude promontories, South Africa and AustraJia,New Zealand, became zones of Western European colonization; in all the re, mainder the European position rested upon military occupation. But the Russian railroad,builder laying his steel strands into the heart of Central Asia and the Russian peasant shoving the settlement frontier along the Trans,Siberian and infiltrating into the heartland valleys represented a contiguous, permanent cultural expansion. 20 "In the 1920's Tannu Tuva and Outer Mongolia were brought under effective Soviet control; the Russian position in Sinkiang has fluctuated, never being politically formalized, but this provinoe has apparently been functionally under Soviet domination since the 1930's. "'The impending contact of the British and Russian imperial frontiers was a matter of world-wide attention sixty years ago, but the ensuing stability of that contact, the retarded imperial development of Russian Central Asia, and the rise of the German and Japanese threats caused a recession of general concern. It is of interest to note T oday the full meaning of these contrasting "imperial" pos1t1ons has become apparent. Whereas the European colonial system in Asia has crumbled and nearly disappeared, Central Asia is being assimilated, "Russianized," and tightly incorporated into the body of the national state. 21 With the withdrawal of Europe, the whole maritime rimland of Asia is rapidly shrinking back toward a pre-European shallow fringe. The new dynasty in China represents a fi.rm reversa! of the Nationalist maritime orientation, back to the patterns of the Manchus, Mongols, and Hansin short, a north China landward domination. Indicative is the return of the national capital from the Y angtse seaport of Nanking back to northern, inland Peiping, while the shriveling of overseas traffic is counterbalanced by the building of new railroads along the old caravan routes toward Mongolia and Sinkiang, giving a modern medium for the old inward ties across the heartland. China has once more oscillated into a continental rimland state.
ln newborn lndia the same trend, if less rapid, is nevertheless discern· ible in the national economic program of domestic industries and self. support. lndia, like all former colonies, is determined to withdraw from the exploitable realm and build her future internally upon domestic resources rather than remain heavily dependent upon vital overseas connections. The rulers of lndia today represent continuity with old Hindu Gangetic lndia, not maritime Dravidian South lndia. 2 2
The Mediterranean-Suez-Red Sea route, that narrow east-west water· way cutting through the Afro-Eurasian land mass which brought so many economic advantages in time and distance, has become a zone of political difficulty with the loss of European domination. The replacement of the British, French, and ltalian colonial realm by the independent nations of the Arab League represents the reconversion of the maritime rimland into a continental zone, the former contracting until it is little wider than the the following prescient statement from one of the great geographers of the last century: "At the very center of her power [lndia] she [England] has nothing to depend upon beyond her European troops and native mercenaries. . . . Slower in their movements . . . the Russians have, as a military power, advantages of another description over their English rivais. Their territory is not composed of scattered fragments, but forms from the shores of Lapland to the Pamir a perfect geographical unity. A large portion of the inhabitants are, moreover, of Russian stock, and this ethnical element is yearly increasing by colonization. . . . Hence national cohesion may be ultimately realized in Asiatic as easily as it has been in European Russia. The Russians will also, like the English, soon doubtless succeed in giving greater material cohesion to their Asiatic Empire by means of military routes, lines of wells, and even railways across the intervening wastes. waters of Suez itself. The security of the sea lanes, once based upon a broad continuous belt of alien control, is now reduced to a scattering of points: Malta, Cyprus, Aden, and European Somalia. ln Europe a parallel trend is likewise apparent, though springing from a reversa! of Asian conditions. Whereas the latter represent a resilient reorientation once the alien domination is withdrawn, the changes in central and east Europe represent the capture of the inner margin of the maritime rimland by a continental power. T oday the Soviet satellites are politically shackled to the east; and despite a still important trade with the west, increasingly their national economies are being shaped to the needs of the continental Communist bloc. Thus from Manchuria to Poland a broad continental rimland has been re,created, reversing a cen, tury of seaward orientation.
How does the geopolitical position of the Soviet Union today fit into this fivefold scheme? Moreover, and this is the real test, will any such categorization contribute to our understanding of the unfolding patterns of geopolitical relationships? The Soviet Union may be described as a continental rimland power which has captured and is in the process of assimilating most of the heartland. Such a characterization is not a mere artifice, a warping of reality to fit an arbitrary framework, but carries valuable descriptive meaning. The U.S.S.R. may be labeled a continental rimland state because her main developments in agriculture and industry, and the bulk of her population, are still lodged west of the heartland. The Moscow,Urals,Ukraine triangle is still the functional center of gravity of the nation. Only when that nucleus has been expanded eastward in Siberia and Central Asia can the nation properly be labeled a true heart, land state, within the framework of our definitions. Should this be clone, the Soviet Union will be in a position to reap in full the advantage of those peculiar qualities inherent in the heartland position. Already by extending her political fronder over the interior zone she has placed herself in direct political contact with rimland realms from Norway to China. But that contact is yet greatly varied in its functional significance from area to area. The full political potential cannot be realized until the economic patterns are elaborated. Russia has had, of course, conscious economic designs in this direction for over half a century. Prior to the revolution little was achieved beyond the construction of the rail line from Orenburg to Tashkent, the colonization of a narrow strip along the Trans, Siberian, and the scattered infiltration by Russian settlers into the heartland valleys. Twenty-five years ago, however, these designs were greatly elaborated and the pace of change enormously accelerated. The building of the Kuznetz, Karaganda, and Baïkal industrial complexes, the developments in agriculture and light industry in the Central Asia valleys, and the expansion of the farming frontier into the virgin Kazak steppes represent a steadily progressive integration of the heartland into the functional structure of the nation. But to unlock the military and commercial potential of this nuclear region requires more than interna! development. The logical extension of these designs would be the weaving of a rail, motorway, pipeline, and air network across the frontiers and the development of regional and national reciprocity between heartland and rimland. This kind of economic penetration has already given an underpinning to political domination of the eastern heartland in Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia, and similar designs upon Afghanistan are apparently underway. The effectiveness of such plans will of course vary greatly both economically and politically among the many bordering nations. However, it would be a grave mistake to center our concern only upon those areas where the economic and political penetrations are advancing concomitantly. Economie relations need not be overlaid with alien political control in order to assume geopolitical significance. They need only to reach a level wherein the economic stability of one of the nations rests upon the maintenance of those relations. It is quite conceivable that the heartland could become once more the nexus of vital trade routes with and among the rimland regions, and that the Soviet Union could gradually build a pattern of economic interdependence wth all her bordering nations. In this manner, without the use of military force or political penetration, she could achieve a measure of domination over most of Eurasia. Such a development would obviously mark a fondamental shift in the geopolitical patterns of the Old World, with wide ramifications, economic, political, and strategic, upon the entire globe. lt would mark, in short, the capture of the rimland and its completed reorientation from an outward maritime zone to an inward continental periphery.
This framework of functional definitions may likewise have value in serving as a corrective to that widespread and dangerous oversimplification: the famous Russian "urge to the sea." For years it has been commonly assumed that the "drive for warm-water ports" has been a mainspring of Russian foreign policy and her central territorial concern, some writers exaggerating it into an almost lemming-like instinct. 23 There have indeed been periods when the acquisition of certain coastal positions was important, most especially with regard to the Baltic in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but as Professor John A. Morrison has so effectively pointed out, this concern cannot be generalized into a basic motivation to cover expansion during ail eras and in every direction. 24 Such an interpretation reveals the sea-oriented modern West trapped by its own stereotyped view of the world in which a landlocked interior position is seen as implicitly disadvantageous. But once an efficient overland transport system became available, Russia was in a position with enormous potential advantages, for she could place herself in direct functional contact with the entire rimland. And it is that rimland, reoriented to the interior, and not the seaports and ocean commerce that is the most significant aim and prize of the pressures outward, and the most significant danger to the Western world.
lt is imperative that such casual and simple assumptions as to the "natural" orientations of peoples and nations be rooted out of our thinking. lnterpretations must be grounded upon the functional conditions of past and present. This fivefold categorization of Eurasian positions is admittedly still a rather loose generalization, needing much more care in both definition and application. It is quite probable that the examples chosen in the illustration of the several categories are not the best, nor even perhaps correct. Nevertheless, it is off ered as a conceptual framework which is of practical relevance, is of wider applicability than the heartland and rimland of Mackinder and Spykman, and will give greater meaning and stability to those useful terms. Purely military-strategic analyses are inherently ephemeral, 25 but strategy is a peacetime matter also, and sound geopolitical strategy must always rest upon peoples-upon culture-national groups in their regional-global settings. 26 This is the justification for this attempt to transpose these positional concepts out of their military context and give them broader meaning. The basic geopolitical patterns of the world are inherently dynamic, changing day by day, often inscrutably, always complexly. It is essential that our image of the world reflect those changes and this demands generaiized tools and concepts. Though our attention has been solely upon Eurasia, and thereby can reflect but a partial and distorted image of the real picture, there is relevance to this view. The recession of the maritime rimland, the inward reorientation of 24 a broad peripheral zone, and the gradual development of the Soviet Union into a true heartland power with all the advantages inherent in that central position, these are crucial trends of our times and must be recognized in the formulation of policy. The United States may be the repository of a prodigious retaliatory force, but this alone can hardly guarantee a desirable world position. lnsofar as our effective peacetime position in Asia is concerned we are in the unenviable situation of being the successor alien power seeking to hold onto the steadily shrinking maritime rimland. Already we must rest principally upon the insular fringe -Japan, Okinawa, Formosa, the Philippines. Our position upon the Asian mainland is everywhere weak and unstable, and our position in Europe appears to be weakening. Recently, some of our high officials have hailed the apparent change in the foreign policies of the Soviet Union as evidence of the success of American actions. There is apparently less realization that that very change in policy by the Soviet Union will almost certainly accelerate the trends we have noted, and thereby almost certainly accelerate the deterioration of the American position on the rimland of Eurasia.
